There were employees of Studebaker working in parts and "product support" in South Bend as late as the early 1970's (1971, I think). At the seminar of former Studebaker executives at this year's International Meet, Carl Thompson, now in his 90's, discussed being in the group of final South Bend employees. Studebaker kept parts and service people here until enough time had passed that they were no longer legally necessary. He even discussed the fact that in the late 1960's the burgeoning "consumer climate" brought a situation in which a customer complained about a fairly common problem, and tried to get Studebaker to enact what would have been it's only recall. A statistical study was done on parts sales and it was determined no recall was needed under the guidelines of the day. If you were there and missed this seminar, you missed many tidbits like this. The engine assembly plant and foundry did remain open until the end of 1964 production, May of 1964 I think. Some truck production did continue after Christmas that year, and I think December 27 or 28 saw the last civilian truck assembled, and the last Avanti assembled under Studebaker. The last Lark Type, the Bordeaux Red 2dr. Daytona in the Museum, was assembled December 20th. "Studebaker - Less than they Promised" by Michael Beatty, Patrick Furlong and Loren Pennington probably covers the circumstances around the final days as well as anything I've read. It covers the conflicts and confusion on the Board of Directors, the rise and fall of Egbert, and how the Board for some time before the closing struggled with Plan A and Plan B. Plan B was finally enacted Dec. 7th, 1963. As for South Bend and it's economy, I can speak only from a perspective which began in the late 1960's, as that is the earliest I can remember how people talked about it. I'm sure the closing was a severe shock at the time. As a resident of the area my whole life, I can firmly say that most people who weren't Studebaker Employees feel that the area is much better of f without Studebaker, than it was with Studebaker, particularly as Studebaker existed from the mid-1950's forward to the end in 1963. The expression of "being an optimist if you take a lunch pail to work" seems to have been born in South Bend during this time period. Studebaker employees who were laid off often found work at other area firms during the layoffs that were common from 1953-63. They had no loyalty to those other firms, and would leave at the drop of a hat if Studebaker called them back. It had many people on a roller coaster around here. If you consider that about 24,000 people worked at Studebaker in 1950, and only about 3000 people remained at the end in 1963, you can see the impact this yo-yo would have had on the workforce in Michiana. No one can argue that Studebaker made South Bend a major city during it's first 100 years, and the net impact was positive. But by the start of the second hundred years, Studebaker's instability became a liability. The loss has forced the area to diversify. It's never good to have your eggs in one basket. South Bend survived the loss, and actually is stronger because of it. There were employees of Studebaker working in parts and "product support" in South Bend as late as the early 1970's (1971, I think). At the seminar of former Studebaker executives at this year's International Meet, Carl Thompson, now in his 90's, discussed being in the group of final South Bend employees. Studebaker kept parts and service people here until enough time had passed that they were no longer legally necessary. He even discussed the fact that in the late 1960's the burgeoning "consumer climate" brought a situation in which a customer complained about a fairly common problem, and tried to get Studebaker to enact what would have been it's only recall. A statistical study was done on parts sales and it was determined no recall was needed under the guidelines of the day. If you were there and missed this seminar, you missed many tidbits like this. The engine assembly plant and foundry did remain open until the end of 1964 production, May of 1964 I think. Some truck production did continue after Christmas that year, and I think December 27 or 28 saw the last civilian truck assembled, and the last Avanti assembled under Studebaker. The last Lark Type, the Bordeaux Red 2dr. Daytona in the Museum, was assembled December 20th. "Studebaker - Less than they Promised" by Michael Beatty, Patrick Furlong and Loren Pennington probably covers the circumstances around the final days as well as anything I've read. It covers the conflicts and confusion on the Board of Directors, the rise and fall of Egbert, and how the Board for some time before the closing struggled with Plan A and Plan B. Plan B was finally enacted Dec. 7th, 1963. As for South Bend and it's economy, I can speak only from a perspective which began in the late 1960's, as that is the earliest I can remember how people talked about it. I'm sure the closing was a severe shock at the time. As a resident of the area my whole life, I can firmly say that most people who weren't Studebaker Employees feel that the area is much better of f without Studebaker, than it was with Studebaker, particularly as Studebaker existed from the mid-1950's forward to the end in 1963. The expression of "being an optimist if you take a lunch pail to work" seems to have been born in South Bend during this time period. Studebaker employees who were laid off often found work at other area firms during the layoffs that were common from 1953-63. They had no loyalty to those other firms, and would leave at the drop of a hat if Studebaker called them back. It had many people on a roller coaster around here. If you consider that about 24,000 people worked at Studebaker in 1950, and only about 3000 people remained at the end in 1963, you can see the impact this yo-yo would have had on the workforce in Michiana. No one can argue that Studebaker made South Bend a major city during it's first 100 years, and the net impact was positive. But by the start of the second hundred years, Studebaker's instability became a liability. The loss has forced the area to diversify. It's never good to have your eggs in one basket. South Bend survived the loss, and actually is stronger because of it.-------- -------------- There were suicides and lots of emotional problems among the long term workers when the plant shut down. That can't be denied. Some in South Bend thought Studebaker was invincible, and had the belief the plant would never close. The closing was an omen for what was about to happen to many others over the next two decades as the economy and workplace changed not only in South Bend, but all over the country. We were just first, and therefore granted poster child status. Another issue addressed in the seminar was that not all employees lost their pension. In fact, everyone received a payment of some sort. Some employees still receive a pension from Studebaker. Including some of those at the seminar. Everyone with more than twenty years kept their entire pension (with service dates of 1943 and before). Others, including most who broke their time of service to serve in WWII and Korea, received a lump sum settlement which was less than substantial, especially by today's standards. The scars have healed, and yes Studebakers are thought of in a different light than they were twenty, or even ten years ago. Time heals all wounds and good things get better with age. ------------ The Stamping Facility was the last part of Studebaker to remain open in South Bend other than the parts operation. It remained open until the end in 1966, supplying Hamilton. The facility was sold after 1966, and continued to operate until the year 2000. After 1966, it operated producing short runs of body panels for all makes and models of cars, using OEM dies, for the replacement market. It's final name was South Bend Stamping. I had the chance to enter the facility in 1984 during the International Meet. I was taking pictures of my '55 outside the building, which is connected to the Main Assembly building. A guard invited me in to tour both buildings. The former Studebaker presses were tooled up that day to run replacement fenders for 1974-78 Mustang II's. I had a chance to go to the die holding area, where dies were stored for many different makes and models. They were on loan from the OEM's and had to be returned when the run was finished. The presses were huge, taking up the entire height of the two story building. The real treat was when he let me walk the length of the former Studebaker assembly area with him (two city blocks, starting at the point that the overhead body conveyor attached on the south end. The start of Main Assembly). At that time, you could still see the painted marks on the floor for staging. The "body drop" area was still intact, with the operator's chair swung 180 degrees from forward position, waiting for the next guy to hop in and run it. I took pictures with my bank deposit premium Brownie camera. None of the inside views came out, but views I took out of the skylights into the open centers along the assembly line remain as the only proof I did the tour. I'll never forget it. ---------------- I wonder if one of the things that contributed to the demise was the lack or seeming lack of advertising. I can remember Chrysler and Mercury dealers advertising locally but not Studebaker. And the Studebaker dealer was in Wappingers Falls and one in Poughkeepsie. My father remembers that there was a dealer in Beacon too. His feelings are that Studebaker really didn't do much advertising in the 1960's. ---------------- Studebaker's per vehicle advertising costs were high. Yes, there were a lot Studebaker dealers in our area. They were in Poughkeepsie, Wappingers Falls, Beacon, Cold Spring, Newburgh and Pawling, NY. I bought several cars from the dealer in Beacon, both Studebakers and later Dodges (including my new '66 Charger). The Wappingers Falls showroom building was torn down to make way for a new Chamber of Commerce building this year. Ben DiNapoli, partner in the Beacon dealership died this October while I was in Florida. Gary L. ============ One of the things we hear most when running the R 2 or R 3 at the strip is, "We had no idea Studebaker made a car like this." And this is from folks old enough that probably would have known if there had been enough advertising. Advertising only performance wouldn't have sold a great number but performance could have been slipped in with regular ads but probably not enough regular ads either. ============ Actually, Studebaker did advertise performance. They ran ads touting the Bonneville records (both sessions) and some of their suppliers like Champion spark plugs and Sears Allstate tires ran ads re Avanti performance. They were very light on TV (probably due to the expense), but the last Studebaker TV ad I can remember was during a NFL football game in the fall of '63. It featured a family riding in a top-down '64 Daytona convertible demonstrating the stopping power of the disk brakes by stopping for a line of ducks crossing the road. Most people either didn't pay much attention or ridiculed Studebaker ads because it was widely believed that Studebaker was just about done for. Consumer Reports magazine didn't help much either by calling Studebaker "not recommended" because they were about to cease production (among other criticisms). Paul Johnson ========== According to my Rapid City dealer, both Studebaker and the dealers dropped the ball on performance. Although he was one of the smaller dealers in the country, he sold more Avanti powered cars than the largest dealers. If a customer wanted a Cruiser for example, he would point out for a few dollars more he could get a mote powerful "heavy duty" V8. About 50 % of his V8 sales were R1, R2 engines. He said he wrote many letters to the factory about how easy it was to sell the R series cars and suggesting how to do it with various promotions. Even today, in his 80's, he's still convinced that if Studebaker had dealers that knew how to sell, they'd still be making cars. ========= /////////////I've never been much of a fan of Consumer Reports, but this was the first I heard that Studebaker made their "Not Recommended". What other drivel ... er criticisms did they have about Studes? Jeff DeWitt ============ I quote the April 64 on the six CR: " The unsatisfactory engine and poor handling are crippling faults that out weigh the many many good details and neat finish " As we go to press the Studebaker future as a US car and the prospects for continuance of adequate dealer service on it remain perplexed" and the V8: "With the heavy V8 in it's nose, handling is nose heavy, the steering vague and not strong on road sense, these were by far the cars worst characteristic. The steering and handling can be lived with, but must be considered a strong road block to acceptance. The remarks about Studebakers future apply equally " ================ It never ceases to amaze me how some people think they are "improving" on the Stude front end suspension with different applications. I've heard of at least four or five different conversions over the years and I'll bet not one of them is better than the stock set up everything considered. I don't go around corners, road racing, etc. but at 135 mph, my 52 year old handles better than any of the others I've driven at less speed than that. Dan Miller does awfully well with his '64 R 2 in the Atlanta road races against other well set up cars so they can't be as bad as these idiot magazine writers claim. Also, it was Road and Track, or some magazine back in the '60's, that wrote, "The Stude V 8 is dead last in engineering." I'd love to take that joker a ride today, 40 years later with that "dead last" engine. ============ In 1964, I was looking for a peppy car. It had to be a two door hardtop with automatic transmission. I was putting about 35K miles a year of local roads driving on my first car at that time. I certainly knew about and owned Studebakers prior to this. I ended up buying a '64 Fury hardtop with hipo 383, Torqueflite and other options. A dealer installed cam kit and Mallory ignition boosted the factory 330 HP a little more. This car, with what I consider to be a much better transmission (727) than the B-W, cost me much less than an R2 Lark or Hawk would have cost. I put 32K trouble free miles on it in ten months and traded it in on a new '65 Sport Fury. I write this to point out the position that Studebaker was in by citing my own example. Gary L. ----------------- When people ask me why Studebaker went out of business, I put myself at any year after the mid-1950s. I want / need an everyday car. 3 miles away is a Ford dealer where I can get what I want for $2200. Another Ford shop is 5 miles in the other direction. 5 miles away is a Chevrolet dealer where I can get their version for $2250. There's also a Chevy dealer next to Ford dealer #2. There''s are Pymouth dealers here and there, like the Ford and Chevy guys, all with competative prices. 17 miles away is a Studebaker dealer where I can get the South Bend version of what I want for $2495. There are plenty of Studebakers being driven around that area, but I ain't living there. Karl Haas ----------------- /////////I wonder if one of the things that contributed to the demise was the lack or seeming lack of advertising.////////// The answer to your question is yes. But it was only a small part of the picture. By 1963, Studebaker had so many problems at so many different levels, that the easiest solution was "Plan B", or a departure from the auto business. If you are selling cars at the rate of 60,000 per year, and you are trying to compete with companies who have sales in the millions of units, the amount you have to spend per unit sold to get the same exposure is at least more than ten times the amount the guy selling a million or more has to spend per unit. A simple explanation for the apparent lack of advertising. Economies of scale, labor issues, management indecision and weakness, along with aging production facilities, a lack of adequate earnings returned to the auto business during the height of the Lark's success (money spent instead on acquisitions of non automotive businesses due to "foresight" certain members of the Board of Directors who saw the writing on the wall as early as the mid 1950's), and a dealer network which had grown with the Lark, but consisted of too many duals (carried other makes besides Studebaker) and marginal, undercapitalized dealers, all contributed to the demise. There are probably some problems I've left out, but these were the first to come to mind. ----------------- In the early 1900's, more than 2500 firms were involved in the manufacture of autos in the United States. The thinning of the herd had progressed to five in 1960. Due to the passing of Studebaker, we had four in 1970 and 1980. By 1990, there were only three (AMC expired in 1987). By the year 2000, only two companies who's primary business is to manufacture automobiles existed in the United States. Ford And General Motors. Chrysler doesn't count anymore. It's business decisions are made in Stuttgart, Germany (no matter how it's portrayed), even though a large portion of it's manufacturing activity is still in the United States. The examples set by the issues that helped take Studebaker away from us have not relented. They still are at work and may finally have reached their apex in 1998 when the last automobile manufacturer who manufactured, sold and designed automobiles solely in the United States threw in the towel at the height of it's most recent and brilliant success and merged with a foreign automaker to "try" and compete on a global basis. The same Board Member types who took Lark profits and bought other companies have just about completed their somber work. Let's hope creativity like we saw at Studebaker, AMC, and Chrysler finds a place to live in the 21st Century. If not, we're in for a boring future. -------------------- Two more thoughts on this.I'll preface these facts by saying the particular dealership was not marginal. It enjoyed decent sales including substantial government fleet business. Here in Dayton, Ohio the local Stude dealer was Pool Motors. The owner and sales manager are still with us and are members of our SDC chapter. They relate that as early as 1961-62 the regional car auctions and banks would only extend credit at .50 cents on the dollar thus crippling their inventory. By late 62 and into 63, all credit sources dried up. The regional Studebaker reps and South Bend said in effect, 'sorry guys, we got our own problems, your on your own'. The fact that Studebaker management permitted this to happen is amazing. The fact that financial institutions had Stude dead and buried as early as 62 is very telling.It's no wonder the company came to be disliked by it's own people. While a couple pricks apparently were on the company board, you really cant fault the majority of aquisitions done during Egberts regime. Making money for the stockholders is as american as apple pie. Insofar as Lark only production in Canada, I believe that was done for only one reason. To avoid litigation by American Studebaker dealers. To believe it was done in the interest of maintaining production is a pipe dream to me. By the 1960's,Old Stude was not the warm and fuzzy operation it may have once been. At least not for its major dealer in Dayton, Ohio ! My uncle was a long time employee in the Studebaker welding shop who lost his job. I love my Studebaker and Packard. I do not love the way the company operated around here. Ron ------------- Interesting comment about the financing aspect. Right now, even with low interest rates, there is something similar going on in the big truck business. A lot of manufacturers are merging and consolidating ( Mack/Volvo.. Western Star/Freightliner...).. Most truck plants have shut down for the holidays, and many do not plan on re-opening until late January. One truck builder that was building 65 trucks a day in October...built just 65 trucks (total!) in November. Many fleets (some real big fleets, too) cannot get financing to buy new trucks to replace their aging fleets. Several big dealers that built palaces during the boom years a couple years ago are having a terrible time treading water. Bankrupty is an oft heard word. Interesting times, indeed. ------------------- We also note recent joint vehicle projects between Japan and the USA. Kevins points about Chrysler are most accurate and escaped public attention. Lee Iacocca was under a 5-year gag agreement and is now doing interviews on the end of Chrysler as we once knew it.He's real pissed off ! Seems to me the the message is we are heading for 1 or 2 mega-car manufacturers in the world. Recent corporate fire sales by GM because they cant afford employee liabilities including pension and health care are more indicators. As you say, an interesting period indeed ! And, history does indeed repreat in the US auto industry. Any lessons learned from the Studebaker auto demise have in large NOT been remembered very well. I'd bet the next victim will be Navistar, formerly known as International. The Springfield OH truck plant recently laid off most if its help. Shades of South Bend '63 there ! ------------------ Note that Freightliner is a Mercedes owned company, so the German connection still exists. Volvo is a Swedish concern. Mack was previously French. Navistar had money troubles a decade ago and their CEO went over to Europe and sold a ton of stock over there, so a chunk of International is foriegn owned. They're the one's that built the 63 trucks...at that plant. Having an underfunded pension system is more the norm than the exception. A fully funded pension plan can make a tempting takeover target. jeff ------------------------ When the small guys were involved (Stude, AMC, Chrysler), they conducted a fight for survival, against the odds, which included ways of drawing customers without expending the resources like the larger guys. Studebaker's last success was addressing the compact car void in the late 1950's. Everyone was on that bandwagon by 1963. AMC kept going mainly with a niche market for four wheel drive sport utility vehicles. They tried to keep their car business going with innovative products like the Pacer (very roomy compact) and Eagle (4wd passenger cars). By 1987, everyone was in this game too. Chrysler was the real powerhouse of innovation. The Viper started the true American performance car trend again. The Minivan started a whole new product category. They focused their most talented design team on their standard pickup, and set the industry on it's head, taking Dodge from a minor player to annual top ten seller almost overnight. The PT Cruiser did set off a rash of copies, and out of all the "fad retro cars", has the most potential to keep it's legs under it. Because just like most former Chrysler Corp. designs, it backed it's good looks up with utility and ergonomics. It does it's job better than anything else. The only person who seemed to have doubts Chrysler could keep it's edge was Bob Eaton, a financial type who I guess thought it was better to go out on top than take a risk. The result: a merger which was not necessary, and has destroyed Chrysler and it's undisputed world class design team. (They all landed elsewhere, mostly at GM). The cars introduced over the next couple years by Daimler will prove that Chrysler has been reduced to a subordinate of a stodgy, belligerent, closed minded European company that thinks it knows more than anyone else. Will tumbling market share cure their bullheaded ways? I don't think so, because before acquiring Chrysler, the auto business wasn't even 50% of their revenues. They have an attitude like a rural Studebaker dealer in the 50's and 60's. Where will creativity live from this point forward? GM is the only American controlled firm that has the ability to keep it's bottom line black in these market conditions. It's getting used to being market leader again. It ended up with most of the people who fled the Daimler invasion. And the import makes it competes with are now just like the AMC's and Studebaker's of the past. Ford is still busy cleaning up the messes it made when times were good. And Ford is still more interested in cost control than in product development or innovation. GM's the one to watch! ---------------- Within the ranks of Studebaker dealers in the final years, there were some really good dealers. But they were far outnumbered. If you lived in a large metro area, you probably had a very good dealer as your Studebaker Dealer. If you grew up in a rural area, chances are your Studebaker Dealer may have sold farm implements as his major source of revenue, and may not have even been interested in getting in to the car business in a big way. He was not interested in putting big money into your trade. If you didn't like his price, he wouldn't negotiate, because this was just a sideline. And most importantly from the perspective of the factory, he wanted no part of stocking a large number of cars for sale. When he did get a customer, the car had to be ordered (one at a time). Chaos for production schedules, adding to the economies of scale issue. All these problems were like a intermingled ball of twine rolling downhill that just continued to get worse and worse. I read one account in a Studebaker History book that I can't immediately recall, that said although Studebaker had something like 2000 outlets in 1963, less than half could be considered real dealerships. The last couple years, it got to the point that most local banks would not even allow Studebaker cars to be "floor planned", or carried on an inventory loan. Even if the factory could talk a small dealer into stocking a few cars, chances are his bank wouldn't lend him money to carry them. When this started happening, they were technically out of business, even though they were still in business. Things like this made the decision very easy for the Board of Directors. ---------------- I have in my files several factory letters to a small dealer here in Md. They were slightly sarcastic in tone and went something like this: "I'm sure you are aware they Studebaker builds hardtops, convertibles, and Hawks. A quick review of your sales shows that you have ordered nothing but trucks sedans and wagons in the last two years" "How do you expect your customers to become interested in our full line without at least one of the above models. ------------------- Zone reps during the height of the Lark received bonuses for recruiting new dealers. By 1962, it was clear that there was no "quality control" or qualification process when signing up a new dealer, and many people who were now Studebaker Dealers had no business even being in the car business. Back in the late 1980's when I was in the business, I had the chance to work with a successful used car dealer in a small town just east of Fort Wayne, IN. He'd been in the business since the late 40's, and I anxiously awaited his stories everytime we saw each other. One day when I told him I was into Studes, he told me of the Studebaker Zone Rep that kept bugging him almost daily to take on Studebaker in the early 60's. Oh, the dealer didn't have anything against Studebakers. He sold them along with everything else he got used. He got rid of the rep by saying "I won't ruin my business by becoming a Studebaker Dealer" I can't imagine the rejection and mocking those Factory people took in the final days. And the pressure they felt. It couldn't have been a fun job. --------------- \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\The fact that financial institutions had Stude dead and buried as early as 62 is very telling.It's no wonder the company came to be disliked by it's own people.\\\\\\\\\\\\\ |||||||||||This rings true with what a local Stude dealer in Porterville, CA told me. She (her late husband and her co-ran the dealership) lamented that on top of being hard to sell cars in the final years, they had to carry the paper on a sale to effect financing of a sort. To hear her tell it, they spent too much time chasing folks down to either get their money or repossess the vehicle! She claimed that some buyers would do a deal with them because they KNEW they could use the car for some time without having to pay. |||||||||||| As Kevin says, there were some very good metro area dealers who stocked enough cars to be competitive. My uncle bought all vehicles for the state of Kansas. I remember him telling me of buying many Larks for the state through the dealer in Topeka (price was basically the main consideration). The same dealer even got them to try out R-2 Larks for state police cars. They passed because they thought they were too light at 130 mph (which they clocked in testing). And there were small town dealers for whom Studebaker was a side line. I remember seeing a very low miles Avanti in the early 70s that had the price sticker in the window. It listed the dealer as "xxx Hardware, xxx, Kansas. However, there were some very good rural dealers. Anderson Motors, Garnett, Kansas (population maybe 2,000) boasted that there were more Studebaker trucks registered in that county than Ford, Chevy and Dodge COMBINED! They didn't have room to stock many cars (maybe six to eight), but they could get them very quickly from other inventories (this was long before the computerized locator system that dealers use now). Also, one of the Anderson brothers told me he could walk in to the president's office (Studebaker) any time and tell him what he wanted and he would get it. Regarding financing, not only did dealers have trouble floor-planning, but many banks would not make auto loans to Studebaker buyers. Joe Egle Motors, where I bought my Wagonaire, had an Avanti in stock for a long time because he could not find anyone to finance it for his prospective buyers. Paul Johnson ------------ RE: "as early as 1961-62 the regional car auctions and banks would only extend credit at .50 cents on the dollar thus crippling their inventory. By late 62 and into 63, all credit sources dried up. The regional Studebaker reps and South Bend said in effect, 'sorry guys, we got our own problems, your on your own'. The fact that Studebaker management permitted this to happen is amazing." It is amazing they didn't try to do something (really, they did, they gave up on the auto business), but the fact is that the diversification program was probably force fed on the Board by their banks and because they could would not even loan Studebaker Corp. enough capital to run Studebaker Automotive Division properly. There was very little that could have been done. And the Board did it's duty. Studebaker stock never became worthless. Egbert was brought in to oversee the winding down of manufacturing activity in South Bend. Being a "Car Guy", he fell in love with it and tried to save it, much to the dismay of some Board Members who supported his hiring. How much of this activity was posturing and acting so final financial arrangements could be made to exit the auto business will probably never be known. Fact is, the Board had been discussing "Plan B" since the late 1950's. --------------- As you may have seen I've got this line on my Studebaker History page: Studebaker did NOT go out of business, they merged with Worthington Corporation (and there is still a Studebaker - Worthington Corporation website, it is a distant relation), diversified by purchasing many other companies, such as Onan, Gravely, Clark and essentially merged themselves out of existence. If you had a 100 shares of Studebaker stock in 1963 it would be worth quite a bit of money today (although I'm not really sure what company that would be anymore). I'd be REALLY interested in hearing how you make out with that stock, I bet the rest of us would be too. -------------- (to be continued) The foundry was in operation well into 1964. They kept trying to find customers to buy the Studebaker engines so they could keep the foundry open and produce engines for Hamilton after the 1964 model year. With no customers other than Hamilton, it was just too expensive to keep the foundry open, so had to source the engines you-know-where for 1965. BP Apr 2003 ------------------------ My father is Charlie Pratt, and he was VP in charge of >>acquisitions for Studebaker and bought a lot of companies that prevented >>S from having to take bankruptcy. Instead, it became Studebaker >>Worthington, and we moved to NY from So. Bend. Dad was in charge of >>selling off all of the auto assets - it took him 3 years, and he was >>written up in LOOK mag. He knew Nate and Ari Altman quite well. Dad is >>86 now, and it is time for him to sell his 2 avantis. He has a 1964- 8th >>one off the assembly line, and this was redone at the factory in the late >>70's. ------------------------------------